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Tw o experiments were conducted to examine correction for perceived bias in 
persuasion situations. Study 1 showed that, although a manipulation of source 
likability had an impact on attitudes when no instruction to remove bias was 
present, when people were asked to remove any bias from their judgments, the 
effect of the source likability manipulation disappeared. The fact that the correction 
instruction did not increase the impact of an argument quality manipulation on 
attitudes suggested that effort aimed at correction is conceptually distinct from 
effort aimed at processing a message in general. Study 2 showed that a correction 
for source likability took place under low elaboration conditions— where a m a­
nipulation of source likability had an impact when no correction instructions were 
provided, and under high elaboration conditions— w herea  manipulation of source 
likability had no impact when no correction instructions w ere provided. In the high 
elaboration conditions, correcting for an impact that was not actually present led 
a dislikable source to be more influential than a likable source.
In society today, dealing with bias (both explicit and implicit) has become 
part of negotiating our social world. Much has been written about the 
nature of bias and prejudice, and research has addressed issues such as: 
What are the causes of prejudice? Who is most likely to show bias? Against 
whom is prejudice directed? Only recently have conceptual and empirical
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efforts been aimed at the issues of when and how people guard against 
bias when they wish to be unprejudiced in their judgments. Because of 
changing norms against prejudice, and because of changing laws that 
forbid bias of any type (e.g., anti-discrimination laws as well as anti-affirm­
ative action initiatives), people might increasingly become vigilant in their 
attempts to avoid unwanted, inappropriate, or illegal biases.
It would be relatively simple if the only factor involved in eliminating 
unwanted biases was the simple desire to be accurate. Current dual-route 
models of persuasion, such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and the Heuristic/Systematic Model (HSM; 
Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) hold that when people wish to be 
accurate, they are often more diligent in examining all available relevant 
information. Sometimes this enhanced effortful processing appears to 
eliminate the effects of certain "biasing" variables. For example, when 
motivation to think about a persuasive message was increased by adding 
to the personal relevance of the communication or making people ac­
countable for their judgments, the impact of a manipulation of source 
likability was eliminated (see Chaiken, 1980; Petty, Cacioppo, & Schu­
mann, 1983). This result could have occurred because of a correction 
process (i.e., people adjusted their assessments of the issue for the per­
ceived biasing influence of the source; Petty & Wegener, 1993; Wegener
& Petty, 1995), but it also could have occurred because a person's effortful 
processing of arguments overwhelmed the impact of the source (Chaiken 
et al., 1989), or because examining source likability as a piece of issue-rele­
vant information (i.e., treating it as an argument) made people realize that 
it was irrelevant to the judgment and was thus discounted (see Petty, 1994, 
for a discussion of these and other possibilities).
Importantly, current research on persuasion indicates that increasing the 
extent of effortful information processing does not invariably eliminate 
effects of potential biasing factors. In fact, current research guided by the 
ELM and HSM clearly suggests that the enhanced processing invoked 
when motivation and ability to think are high can be quite biased. For 
example, in one study (Petty, Schumann, Richman, & Strathman, 1993), 
students were exposed to an advertisement in the context of a program 
that induced a pleasant or a neutral mood. Motivation to think about the 
advertisement was varied by manipulating the personal relevance of the 
product (cf., Petty & Cacioppo, 1979b; Petty et al., 1983). The primary result 
of this study was that mood influenced (i.e., biased) judgments under both 
high and low elaboration conditions, but the mechanism was different. 
Under high elaboration conditions, making the recipients' mood more 
pleasant led to more favorable thoughts about the product which in turn 
led to more favorable attitudes. Under low elaboration conditions, how­
ever, mood influenced attitudes without affecting thoughts. That is, in­
creasing people's desire to be accurate by adding to the importance of the
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judgment did not eliminate or even reduce the biasing impact of mood. 
Higher levels of elaboration simply led to more thought-based biases (see 
also, Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Wegener, Petty, & Klein, 1994).
In sum, increasing accuracy motivation and increasing information 
processing do not necessarily eliminate the effects of biasing variables 
such as a person's mood, or the likability of a source. In part, to deal with 
these phenomena and others, the flexible correction model (FCM) was 
developed (Petty & Wegener, 1993; Wegener & Petty, 1995; 1997). Accord­
ing to the FCM, increasing accuracy motivation, or the motivation and 
ability to think, does not necessarily lead to correction attempts because 
even highly thoughtful people are not necessarily aware of the impact of 
any biasing variable(s) in the current context. According to the FCM, in 
order for correction for bias to take place, people should (a) be motivated 
and able to search for potential biases, (b) find a potential source of bias, 
(c) have or generate a theory regarding the direction and magnitude of the 
bias, and (d) be motivated and able to correct for the bias based on this 
theory (see Wegener & Petty, 1997; cf. Martin, Seta, & Crelia, 1990; 
Schwarz & Bless, 1992; Strack, 1992; Wilson & Brekke, 1994).1
Thus, the FCM hypothesizes that increasing accuracy motivation or 
increasing the motivation and ability to think per se, will often not be 
sufficient to invoke correction processes. Of course, increasing the moti­
vation to be accurate alone might often increase motivation to search for 
bias and correct for it, but sometimes the presence and impact of biasing 
factors are not salient unless some more explicit attention is drawn to 
them (cf., Schwarz & Clore, 1983).
One important feature of a model of corrections based on perceivers' 
naive theories is that opposite theories of bias lead corrections in differ­
ent directions. That is, if people believe that some biasing factor is 
making (or would make) their judgment of a target too similar to the 
context (perception of assimilation bias), they would correct their judg­
ments to be less like the context. But, if people believe that some biasing
1. Although we believe that novel corrections generally require some rather explicit 
awareness of a potential biasing factor, as people become more practiced at particular 
corrections, corrections themselves might become more implicit (and thus, people might 
be less aware of the potential biases corrected or of the operation of the bias correction 
process). Even for novel theory-based corrections, which we conceptualize as relatively 
effortful compared with lack of correction (see Wegener & Petty, 1997), we do not regard 
corrections as necessarily due to completely conscious processes. That is, even though 
judges' naive theories of bias often predict the direction and magnitude of corrections (e.g., 
Wegener & Petty, 1995), this does not mean that people would be able to report the 
processes they used to execute the correction (cf. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). That is, even if 
people can verbalize a theory of bias, there can be implicit effects of that theory (see 
Wegener & Petty, this issue), and people would not necessarily be expected to know which 
theory(ies) they used more than other theories, for example.
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factor is making (or would make) their judgment of a target too distant 
from the context (perception of contrastive bias), they would correct their 
judgments to be more like the context (for empirical evidence of correc­
tions consistent with the direction and magnitude of people's naive 
theories, see Petty & Wegener, 1993; Wegener & Petty, 1995; Wegener, 
Petty, & Dunn, in press).
In our initial attempts to extend the FCM into persuasion settings, we 
considered two primary research questions: (1) Is effort aimed at removal 
of bias conceptually distinct from effort aimed at scrutiny of attitude-rele­
vant information? and (2) Can corrections for perceived biases actually 
reverse the typical cue effect of source characteristics such as likability? 
Over the last 20 years, various simple cues (e.g., source attractiveness, 
message length) have been shown to create less impact when scrutiny of 
the content of persuasive messages is high rather than low (e.g., Axsom, 
Yates, & Chaiken, 1987; Petty et al., 1981; Petty et al., 1983; Wood & 
Kallgren, 1988). As noted earlier, this might or might not be the case 
because high elaboration includes removal of the unwanted influences of 
such cues. We suspect that when people are busy paying close attention 
to, and thinking carefully about, the merits of information presented, they 
will sometimes be unlikely to even identify characteristics of the source 
as biasing factors. If so, source likability might have little impact, not 
because of corrections for its perceived biasing impact, but rather because 
of a relative lack of attention to or use of the source characteristics—or 
because any cue impact of the source is overwhelmed by the reactions to 
the other available information. Furthermore, if people are relatively 
unaware of the biasing potential of a source, it is possible that the source's 
impact could even be increased under high elaboration conditions [e.g., 
if a likable (dislikable) source leads people to engage in favorably (unfa­
vorably) biased processing; cf., Petty et al., 1993; Chaiken & Maheswaran, 
1994]). Finally, if source likability is salient, people might process the 
likability as an argument and discount it based on its irrelevance to the 
merits of the advocacy. In none of these instances are people correcting 
for the perceived biasing impact of source likability.2
Despite the lack of previous attention to correction processes in persua­
sion, we believe that corrections can operate in these settings and that such
2. Within the ELM, processing source likability for its merit could include an analysis of 
the potential biasing impact of this variable (as specified by the FCM), but likability could 
also be discounted just as any other weak argument is dismissed (without considering the 
potential impact of the information and then adjusting for it). That is, the FCM mechanism 
is more specific than that outlined by the ELM and thus supplements it (as do other more 
specific theories postulating both central (e.g., cognitive response theory, expectancy x 
value models) and peripheral (e.g., classical conditioning, use of heuristics) mechanisms 
(see Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; Petty & Wegener, 1998, in press).
processes might bring about some interesting persuasion outcomes. For 
example, within the FCM framework, corrections aimed at removing 
perceived biases can sometimes create a bias in the opposite direction (e.g., 
if people "overcorrect," which might be especially likely if the perceptions 
of the bias are exaggerated in relation to the size of any actual bias at work), 
can create biases where there were none previously (see Wegener & Petty, 
1995; Wegener et a l, in press), or might enhance a bias that exists (if the 
person thinks that an opposite bias is actually operating; see Wegener & 
Petty, 1997). Therefore, one of the research questions we addressed in this 
initial persuasion work regarded the possibility of reversing the usual 
effects of source characteristics when people attempt to remove the per­
ceived influences—real or imagined—of those aspects of the source.
Our first step was to establish a paradigm in which elicitation of 
corrections did not also enhance scrutiny of presented attitude-relevant 
information. If such a dissociation could not be found, this would 
suggest that correction and scrutiny are not as conceptually distinct as 
we have hypothesized. Therefore, in our first experiment, we m anipu­
lated a characteristic of the source (i.e., likability) and either asked people 
to correct for the perceived influence of this factor or did not. In addition, 
as an index of the extent of elaboration given to the content of the 
presented information, we manipulated the quality of the arguments 
presented in the message (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Wegener, Down­
ing, Krosnick, & Petty, 1995, for description of this procedure). If our 
attempts at eliciting corrections change the amount of scrutiny given to 
the message arguments, we should find a corresponding change in the 
persuasion difference between strong (compelling) and weak (specious) 
argument conditions (see Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976). That is, individu­
als instructed to correct should show a larger impact of argument quality 
on attitudes than those not instructed to correct. If corrections can occur 
without changing the amount of message scrutiny, this would provide 
some initial evidence that correction and scrutiny can be distinct and 
would also set the stage for additional studies.
EXP E R IM E N T 1
METHOD
Participants and Design. Undergraduate students at Ohio State (N = 120) 
participated as a means of partially satisfying an introductory psychol­
ogy course requirement. They were tested in groups ranging in size from 
1 to 10 and were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions compris­
ing the 2 (Source likability: liked or disliked) x 2 (Argument quality: 
strong or weak) x 2 (Correction: instruction or none) between-partici- 
pants design.
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Upon entering the laboratory, all participants were told, both verbally 
and in writing, that the experimenter was working with the Department 
of Communications to investigate how people evaluate and respond to 
different styles and modes of communication. Participants were told that 
they would read transcripts from a radio broadcast that took place on 
campus the previous year. They were told that the transcripts would 
include a short interview and a speech from a college official. After 
reading the speech, they responded to a questionnaire booklet. Follow­
ing this, they were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
Likability Manipulation. Participants were first asked to read an excerpt 
from an interview with the person whose speech they would evaluate. 
The interview was one page in length and consisted of a short question- 
and-answer section (e.g., name, job status), in which it was revealed that 
the speaker used to work at the University of Michigan—a rival institu­
tion. The next set of questions asked the speaker to compare the two 
schools, and the speaker's responses to these questions were used to 
manipulate the likability of the source (see Chaiken, 1980). In brief, the 
likable speaker praised the participants' school over the rival school (e.g., 
"the students here are more engaged and very concerned with their role 
in our society, something rarely seen at my other school"), whereas the 
unlikable source derogated the participants' school in favor of the rival 
school (e.g., "the students here are less mature than those at my other 
school"). In order to enhance the salience of the source likability m anipu­
lation, all participants were asked to rate their impressions of the source 
right before completing the key measures of attitudes toward the position 
advocated in his speech. These source ratings were made on a series of 
9-point (+4 to -4) semantic differential scales (e.g., likable/dislikable, 
friendly/ unfriendly).
Argument Quality Manipulation. After reading either the likable or 
dislikable interview, participants read that the topic of the speech dealt 
with the implementation of senior comprehensive exams. The speaker 
indicated that he had prepared a background paper on the policy of 
requiring seniors, prior to graduation, to pass a series of exams to 
demonstrate their general competency—as well as the specific skills 
required by their major area of study. Failure to pass these tests would 
require remedial work before the degree could be conferred. No mention 
was made regarding when the policy was recommended to take effect.
Next, participants were given a speech transcript that was approxi­
mately 1.5 pages in length. The speech contained either four strong 
arguments (e.g., starting salary for graduates of institutions with the 
exams increased by over $4000) or four weak arguments (e.g., exams 
improved student motivation by increasing the students' anxiety levels).
PROCEDURE
These arguments were used by White and Harkins (1994) and adapted 
from those developed by Petty and Cacioppo (1986). Participants were 
given ample time to read the speech (4 minutes), and then were asked
Correction Instruction Manipulation. Just prior to completing the meas­
ures of attitudes toward the comprehensive exam policy, all participants 
were told that, because their own opinions about the exam policy might 
influence their ratings of the quality of the speech, they would first need 
to give an indication of their personal opinions on the exam policy (cf., 
Petty et al., 1976). For the participants in the correction instruction condi­
tion, they also were told that "other information not related to the speech 
or topic may influence your evaluation of the speech....In making the 
following judgments, please do not let non-speech factors, such as your 
personal opinion about the speaker influence your ratings/' These in­
structions were reiterated verbally before participants turned to the pages 
that contained the attitude and speech measures. Participants in the 
no-instruction condition were not alerted to "non-speech" factors.
Dependent Measures. After completing the source questions and receiv­
ing the correction instruction manipulation (or not), all participants 
completed measures of their attitudes toward the senior comprehensive 
exam policy. First, they were asked to indicate the extent to which they 
agreed with the proposal of senior exams on an 11-point scale (l-"do not 
agree at all" to ll-"agree completely"). Next, participants rated the 
concept of senior exams on four 9-point semantic differential scales (+4 
to -4, good/bad, beneficial/ harmful, foolish/wise, and unfavorable/fa-
Following the attitude items, they completed some ancillary measures 
(e.g., impressions of the speech—such as its clarity), and finally some 
questions designed to serve as manipulation checks on the argument 
quality and source likability manipulations. To check on argument 
quality, participants were asked, "Were the arguments used in the 
speech of high quality?" Responses were made on a scale ranging from 
"not at all" (1) to "very high quality" (11). To check on the source 
likability manipulation, participants rated, "How likable did you feel the 
person who made the speech was?" and "Did the person who made the 
speech seem friendly to you?" on 11-point scales ranging from "not at 
all likable (friendly)" (1) to "very likable (friendly)" (11).
The data were analyzed in a series of 2 (liked or disliked source) x 2 
(strong or weak arguments) x 2 (correction instruction or not) analyses
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Manipulation Checks. An index of source likability was computed by 
averaging the participants' responses to the two source manipulation 
check questions (r = .86). Analysis revealed only a main effect for source, 
F( 1, 111) = 28.44, p < .0001. Participants exposed to the likable source 
rated the source higher on the index (M = 7.22) than participants 
exposed to the dislikable source (M = 5.06; the same results are obtained 
using the likability measures collected before the attitude measures). 
The argument quality check revealed a main effect for argument qual­
ity, F(l, 112) = 31.45, p < .0001. Participants rated the strong arguments 
(M = 7.55) as better in quality than the weak arguments (M = 5.35). Also, 
a smaller but significant main effect was found for source, F(l, 112) = 
5.26, p < .03, with participants exposed to the likable source rating the 
arguments (M = 6.90) as better than participants exposed to the dis­
likable source (M = 6.00). No other effects emerged.
A ttitude Measure. Because the scales were highly correlated (mean r 
= .84), participants' responses to the five attitude measures were 
combined. The scores were standardized to make the 11-point and 
9-point scales comparable, and then they were averaged. First, a main 
effect for argum ent quality was found, F(l, 112) = 13.35, p = .0004. 
Participants who read the strong arguments were more in favor of the 
exam policy (M = .29) than participants who read weak argum ents (M 
= -.29). This main effect of argument quality was not moderated by the 
presence or absence of a correction instruction (F < 1). Of greater 
interest, a Source likability x Correction instruction interaction was 
obtained, F(l, 112) = 6.88, p < .01 (see Figure 1). In the absence of the 
correction instruction, the typical effect of source likability was ob­
tained: People reacted more favorably toward the exam policy when 
it was presented by a likable source than by a dislikable source (p < 
.10). However, when people were warned of a possible bias, this source 
effect disappeared and was slightly reversed. The reversal in the 
pattern was due to the fact that recipients who received the dislikable 
source and were told to correct were significantly more favorable 
toward the senior comprehensive exam issue (M = .23) than were 
recipients who received the dislikable source but were not told to 
correct (M = -.35), p < .05. No difference was found between partici­
pants exposed to the likable source in the no correction versus correc­
tion conditions (M = .18 and M  = -.07, respectively), p > .15.
DISCUSSION
In Study 1, students received a proposal from a likable or a dislikable 
source that contained either strong or weak arguments in favor of 
instituting senior comprehensive exams. When no correction instruction
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FIGURE 1. Attitudes as a function of liking for source and correction instruction in 
Experiment 1.
N ote. Higher numbers indicate more favorable attitudes.
was given, attitudes toward the proposal were more favorable when the 
message was presented by a likable rather than dislikable source. How­
ever, when a correction instruction was given, attitudes were in the 
direction of being more favorable when the message was presented by 
a dislikable rather than likable source. People were especially likely to 
correct for a dislikable source.3
It is important to note that, in this study, the correction instruction had 
no impact on the size of the argument quality effect on respondents' 
attitudes, suggesting that the observed correction was not due to chang­
ing the amount of elaboration aimed at processing the substantive 
arguments contained in the message (Petty et al., 1976). The fact that the 
same argument quality effect was present regardless of whether a cor­
3. Of course, because there was not a "no source" control group in this research, we 
cannot tell if the source bias in the no correction conditions is due to an unfavorable bias 
for the dislikable source, a favorable bias for the likable source, or both. In any case, 
regardless of the actual bias induced, the FCM holds that people correct for the perceived 
or expected bias. Thus, in this study, the FCM would suggest that participants might have 
perceived or expected less of an influence of the likable source (perhaps because many of 
their reactions to the counterattitudinal message were less than favorable), or might have 
been more motivated to correct for the negatively biasing influence of the dislikable source 
(see Wegener & Petty, 1997, for additional discussion).
rection occurred or not is consistent with our hypothesis that effort 
aimed at scrutinizing issue-relevant information is distinct from effort 
aimed at removal of bias, at least when the correction instruction follows 
the message.
Although we generally regard theory-based corrections as requiring 
greater cognitive effort than lack of correction in the same setting—at least 
until such corrections become well-practiced and routinized (cf. Smith, 
1989)—this is not to say that uncorrected outcomes are necessarily based 
on low levels of cognitive effort. That is, as just noted, effort given to 
theory-based corrections is conceptually distinct from effort given to the 
task in general. Recall that the FCM suggests that theory-based correc­
tions occur only if people identify a factor as potentially biasing and are 
then motivated and able to engage in attempts to remove the perceived 
influence of that factor. Cognitive effort can often be given to a task when 
needs for bias correction are not salient and no potential bias is identified.
This perspective reinforces our view that there are multiple routes to 
diminishing the impact of simple cues in persuasion settings (see Petty, 
1994). That is, the impact of simple cues could be negligible because high 
levels of scrutiny of attitude-relevant information overwhelm the cue 
(Chaiken et al., 1989), because the cue is treated as an argument and is 
dismissed (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), or because of explicit corrective 
efforts to remove a perceived bias associated with the cue (Petty, 1994; 
Wegener, 1994). Of course, the theory-based correction view also raises 
the interesting possibility that effects of cues could be reversed under 
conditions that encourage corrections. As noted previously, studies 
guided by the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and the HSM (Chaiken et 
al., 1989) have generally found decreasing impact of simple cues as 
elaboration of attitude-relevant information increases. The fact that stud­
ies guided by these frameworks have never reported reversals of the 
usual impact of cues suggests that high levels of scrutiny (such as that 
induced by high personal relevance; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979b), might 
not typically induce efforts at correction for perceived bias associated 
with the cues (although corrections could have been responsible for 
attenuation of cue effects if the message recipients' theories of bias 
associated with the cues were reasonably accurate).
In Study 2, we examined correction processes under conditions in 
which people were expected to be engaging in considerable effort in 
scrutinizing a persuasive message, as well as conditions under which 
scrutiny of persuasive messages was expected to be rather minimal. In 
this study, all participants received a message containing strong argu­
ments presented by either a likable or dislikable source. As in Study 1, 
just prior to completing the attitude measures, participants either were or 
were not warned that they should not be influenced by any biasing
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characteristics of the source. In the no-correction conditions, we expected 
to obtain a data pattern consistent with past studies guided by the ELM 
and HSM. That is, source likability should have a greater impact under 
low elaboration conditions rather than high elaboration conditions (e.g., 
Chaiken, 1980; Petty et al., 1983). When low elaboration participants are 
given a correction instruction, we expect them to correct for the biasing 
impact of the source such that the source effect should be attenuated— 
replicating Study 1.
If the source effect is eliminated under high elaboration conditions (as 
in previous studies guided by the ELM and HSM), we can examine if the 
observed elimination of the source factor here, and in prior studies, is 
likely due to correction processes or to other factors. If high levels of 
scrutiny involve explicit attempts to remove the impact of cues, then the 
correction instruction should have little further effect in the high elabo­
ration conditions. If, however, message recipients did not consider the 
biasing nature of the cue while effortfully processing the message argu­
ments, then a correction instruction might have just as much impact as 
in the low-processing/correction-instruction condition. If people at­
tempt to remove a perceived bias (source likability) that is not really 
present under high elaboration conditions, then instructions to correct 
might actually lead the dislikable communicator to be more persuasive 
than the likable communicator.
E X P E R IM E N T 2
METHOD
Participants and Design. Undergraduate students at Ohio State (N = 56) 
participated as a means of partially satisfying an introductory psychol­
ogy course requirement. They were tested in groups ranging in size from
1 to 11 and were randomly assigned to 1 of 8 conditions comprising a 2 
(Source likability: liked or disliked) x 2 (Elaboration: high or low) x 2 
(Correction: instruction or none) between-participants design.4
PROCEDURE
4. The data for this study were collected over a four-week period. About midway 
through the planned experiment, the University of Michigan football team beat a pre­
viously undefeated Ohio State team in the final regular season game of the year. This defeat 
marked the second year in a row in which Michigan had beaten a previously undefeated 
Ohio State team, virtually eliminating Ohio State's chance at a national championship. 
Because this very salient event seemed likely to contaminate the results of the study (given 
that the message source was associated with the U of M), the sessions conducted after the 
defeat were excluded and analyzed separately (see Footnotes 5 and 6).
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The procedure was basically the same as in Study 1. Again, upon 
entering the laboratory, all participants read that the experiment con­
cerned reactions to different modes of communication. As in Study 1, 
participants learned that they would read transcripts from a radio broad­
cast that took place on campus the previous year, and that after reading 
the transcript they would answer some questions. At the end of the 
study, they were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
Elaboration Manipulation. Two factors were varied in order to strongly 
manipulate the elaboration likelihood—issue relevance (Petty & Ca- 
cioppo, 1979b; see Petty, Cacioppo, & Haugtvedt, 1992) and cognitive 
load (Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). First, in 
the low elaboration likelihood conditions, participants were told in the 
transcript that the senior comprehensive exam proposal was being 
considered for implementation for 10 years in the future. Thus, it was 
highly unlikely that any of the participants would be affected by the 
proposal. In addition, low elaboration participants were asked to 
memorize a 7-digit code number (i.e., 7985341) that appeared on their 
transcript booklet so that they could reproduce it on the questionnaire 
booklet that would be distributed shortly. In the high elaboration 
condition, participants were told in the transcript that the exam pro­
posal was being considered for implementation next year, and thus it 
was likely that virtually all of the participants would be affected. The 
high elaboration participants were asked to remember only a one-digit 
session number (i.e., 5). Thus, the elaboration manipulation used a 
combination of motivational and ability factors to instantiate two levels 
of elaboration likelihood.
Likability Manipulation and Persuasive Message. The likability m anipu­
lation was identical to that used in Study 1. That is, participants read 
an excerpt from an interview with the speaker who either praised Ohio 
State students relative to those at the University of Michigan (likable 
source) or disparaged them (dislikable source). In this study, all par­
ticipants read the strong arguments used in Study 1.
Correction Instruction Manipulation. As in Study 1, just prior to the 
attitude measures, all participants were told that because their own 
opinions about the exam policy might influence their ratings of the 
quality of the speech, they would first need to give an indication of 
their personal opinions on the issue. Participants in the correction 
instruction condition also read that: “For purposes of validity...it is 
im portant that you are careful not to let your personal feelings toward 
the speaker influence your judgment of the issue. Please judge the issue 
on its merits only w ithout letting any biasing factors enter in."
Dependent Measures. The first measure in the questionnaire booklet
asked participants to rate their opinions on "instituting senior compre­
hensive exams at Ohio State University." All participants rated the 
concept of senior exams on four, 9-point semantic differential scales (+4 
to -4, good/bad, beneficial/ harmful, foolish/wise, and unfavorable/fa­
vorable). Because only 15 minutes could be allocated to the study, 
students completed only one additional item (intended as a check of the 
correction instruction) following the attitude measure. They were asked 
to rate the extent to which they tried to ignore their personal reactions 
to the speaker while judging his speech on a scale ranging from not at 
all (1) to very much (11).
RESULTS
Ancillary Measure. A  2 (Source likability: liked or disliked) x 2 (Elabora­
tion: high or low) x 2 (Correction: instruction or none) ANOVA on the 
measure of the extent to which participants tried to ignore their personal 
reactions to the speaker revealed only a main effect for the correction 
instruction. Although even students who were not prompted to ignore 
their reactions to the speaker reported that they tried to do so (M = 6.9), 
this was even more true of students instructed to be unbiased (M = 8.2), p 
< .05. The lack of an effect of elaboration likelihood on this measure 
suggests that high levels of processing do not necessarily prompt people 
to try to remove any influence of their reactions to a source's characteristics 
(though such removal could be outside of conscious awareness).5
Attitude Measure. To calculate the attitude score, participants' re­
sponses to the four semantic differential items were summed. Of 
greatest interest, a Source likability x Correction instruction interaction 
was obtained, F(l, 48) = 6.23, p < .02, that was not further m oderated 
by elaboration condition (i.e., three-way interaction p > .6; see Figure
2 for means for all cells). That is, under both high and low elaboration 
conditions, students engaged in similar corrections. When instructed 
to be unbiased in the presence of a dislikable source, people became 
more favorable toward the exam issue (M = 11.64) than when not told 
to be unbiased (M = 7.21), p < .05. When instructed to be unbiased in 
the presence of a likable source, judgements were somewhat less
5. The students who participated in the experiment following the Ohio State defeat by 
Michigan reported that they did not try to ignore their personal reactions, regardless of 
whether they were prompted (M = 5.1) or not (M = 4.8). In fact, students participating after 
the Ohio State defeat were significantly less likely to report trying to ignore their personal 
reactions to the speaker (M = 4.9) than were students participating prior to the Ohio State 
defeat (M = 7.5 ) , p<  .001.
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FIGURE 2. Attitudes as a function elaboration condition, liking for source, and 
correction instruction in Experiment 2.
N ote . Higher numbers indicate more favorable attitudes.
favorable (M = 9.29) than when not told to be unbiased (M = 10.57), 
n.s.
One might wonder whether the correction m anipulation had a simi­
lar effect in the high and low elaboration conditions because of a failed 
elaboration manipulation. Some evidence that the elaboration ma­
nipulation was successful, however, comes from the fact that when 
considering only the conditions in which no correction instruction was 
given (i.e., the conditions that most closely replicate prior persuasion 
research), a marginal two-way interaction is obtained such that source 
likability has a larger impact on attitudes under low elaboration (M 
likable source = 12.14; M  dislikable source = 6.00) than under high 
elaboration conditions (M likable source = 9.00; M dislikable source = 
8.43), F(1, 24) = 2.96, p < .09 (see Figure 2). This is what would be 
expected if under high elaboration conditions, processing the argu-
merits overwhelms the source likability information, or the source is 
evaluated as an argument and is discounted.6
DISCUSSION
In Study 2, students who received a persuasive message under low 
elaboration conditions with no correction instruction were more per­
suaded by a likable than a dislikable source. Providing a correction 
instruction, however, eliminated the typical source effect. Similarly, 
consistent with prior research, making the issue high in relevance also 
eliminated the source effect (see Figure 2). Based on this evidence 
alone, it might have been concluded that high elaboration processing 
leads people to explicitly correct for biasing factors such as source 
likability. If high relevance led to a correction, however, then explicitly 
instructing students to correct should have little additional impact on 
judgments. Yet, when people who had initially processed the message 
at high levels received a correction instruction, a correction still oc­
curred. As a result of correcting when no bias was present, the impact 
of the source likability m anipulation was reversed—the dislikable 
source was more persuasive than the likable source. Thus, it appears 
that enhanced message processing per se does not imply correction, 
and that corrections can occur regardless of the effort initially put into 
a judgment task. The fact that corrections occurred even when there 
was no impact of the cue before correction (i.e., in the high-elaboration 
conditions), is consistent with previous work suggesting that correc­
tions are aimed at removing the perceived effect of the biasing factor 
rather than the actual bias that occurs (e.g., Wegener & Petty, 1995; 
Wegener et al., in press).
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6. The attitude results for students who participated following the Ohio State defeat were 
dramatically different. For these students, only a marginal Elaboration x Source likability 
interaction emerged (p < .07), indicating that the source likability manipulation had a larger 
impact under high relevance conditions than under low relevance conditions. We suspect 
that the intense disliking of the source for these students motivated effortful counterargu- 
ing under the high elaboration conditions and the effect of this counterarguing was greater 
than the cue impact of likability (see Petty, 1994; Petty & Wegener, in press). Prior research 
has shown that motivation to counterargue can lead to a significant reduction in the 
persuasiveness of a message under high elaboration conditions, even if the message 
contains strong arguments (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1979a). The correction instruction had 
no impact on these students, presumably because they reported that they were no more 
likely to try to ignore the source when asked to correct than when not asked. Thus, when 
negative feelings toward a source are very strong and salient (and perhaps perceived as 
justified), people may not correct their judgments even when explicitly instructed to do so.
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The psychological study of attitude change has provided considerable 
insight into many processes by which persuasion can occur. For exam­
ple, according to the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), characteristics of 
sources (such as their perceived expertise, likability, or attractiveness) 
can influence persuasion by acting as simple cues to message validity, 
by influencing the amount or nature of scrutiny of attitude-relevant 
information, or, in some circumstances, by acting as attitude-relevant 
arguments (for recent reviews see Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Petty
& Wegener, 1998). The current research deals with the issue of what 
happens when recipients of persuasive messages become aware (or 
believe they have become aware) of some possible biasing effect of a 
persuasion variable (e.g., "the mere number of arguments made me 
more favorable than I ordinarily would have been") or some process by 
which the variable has had an effect (e.g., "I often use the rule of thumb 
that 'the more arguments, the more valid the conclusion is' when I'm not 
sure what to believe").
In some circumstances, existing theories of attitude change suggest that 
increased salience of a given persuasion variable, such as source likability, 
might increase the impact of the process by which the variable has an 
effect. Thus, making the mere number of arguments salient (e.g., by 
numbering each argument in a message), or making the attractiveness of 
the source of a message more salient (e.g., by including a large color 
picture rather than a small black and white one), might increase the 
likelihood that a number or attractiveness heuristic would have an impact 
on attitude change. In fact, within the HSM, Eagly and Chaiken (1993) 
have explicitly argued for a such an effect. According to the HSM, stored 
heuristics influence persuasion only to the extent that they are available 
and accessible in memory, and "factors that affect the accessibility of 
heuristics should exert a corresponding effect on the judgmental impact 
of heuristic cues" (p. 330). That is, heuristics should have a greater impact 
on attitudes to the extent that the heuristics come easily to mind when the 
message recipient encounters a persuasive appeal. Also, this model posits 
that, even under high elaboration conditions, as long as the invoked heuristic 
does not contradict the other information presented, the heuristic should 
add to the impact of the other information (Maheswaran & Chaiken,
1991). Thus, this position would generally suggest that increases in sali­
ence of a persuasion cue (as long as the cue is associated with a stored 
heuristic) should lead to corresponding increases in the judgmental im­
pact of the cue. This position has received some empirical support (e.g., 
see Pallak, 1983), and seems especially useful for contexts in which 
multiple relevant heuristics might be hypothesized to exist.
GENERAL D IS C U S S IO N
In the ELM, the salience of any given variable might have different 
effects, depending on the likelihood of elaboration. That is, when the 
likelihood of thinking is low, increased salience of a source characteristic 
would likely increase its "peripheral" impact compared to other poten­
tial cues (e.g., making an "attractiveness heuristic" more likely than a 
"number heuristic" to guide judgments). Under high elaboration condi­
tions, however, increased salience of an attractive source would likely 
increase the scrutiny it received as a message argument (i.e., as a piece 
of information relevant to determining the validity of the position es­
poused). If under scrutiny, the attractiveness of the source was deemed 
relevant to validity, its impact would be increased (and added to that of 
the other relevant information); but if under scrutiny, the attractiveness 
of the source was deemed irrelevant or not cogent, its impact would be 
decreased (see Petty & Wegener, in press). Increasing the salience of a 
source characteristic could also increase its biasing effect on information 
processing, but only to the extent that people were unaware that the 
variable was producing an unwanted bias. The fact that variables can 
serve in different roles under high and low elaboration conditions has 
received empirical support (Miniard et al., 1991; Petty & Cacioppo, 
1984a, 1984b), although the impact of increasing the salience of the
The current research examines what happens when a factor in the 
persuasion setting—a likable or dislikable source in this instance—be­
comes salient as a possible source of bias. Although correction for bias 
was not addressed in previous discussions of cue salience (such as 
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), we believed that when salient cues are also 
considered as potentially biasing, a very different type of effect (rather 
than enhanced impact of the cue or heuristic) could occur. In our 
Experiment 2, people engaged in correction for a presum ed bias, 
regardless of whether the amount of initial elaboration in which they 
engaged was high or low. The instructed correction for the biasing 
impact of a source factor has not previously been reported in the 
persuasion literature, and in this case led a source factor to have the 
opposite effect that it normally does (when people corrected for an 
expected impact that did not exist—in high elaboration conditions). 
This research suggests that if certain issue-irrelevant variables in the 
persuasion setting (e.g., attractive sources, pleasant moods) are made 
salient, they might not invariably have greater impact on attitudes via 
the heuristic or peripheral routes, or by biasing processing of the 
issue-relevant information (as both the ELM and HSM predict)—or 
might not simply be discounted when processed as an argum ent as the 
ELM anticipates; but they might actually have reversed impact based 
on people's attempts to correct for the perceived bias that the variable
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has produced. Also, in some circumstances, communication norms 
and other factors in the persuasion setting might also make some 
decision rules seem less than legitimate, even though the decision rule 
itself might have formed because of some perceived validity of the 
rule. If so, people might attempt to remove the influence of the variable 
or heuristic (Petty, 1994; Petty et al., 1994; Wegener, 1994).
The research reported here has focused on corrections for perceived 
biases that resulted from a characteristic of the message source. Of 
course, other biases can also be perceived in persuasion settings. For 
example, if people perceive that an environmental factor in the persua­
sion setting—such as an annoying noise—is affecting their reactions to 
the persuasive appeal (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), they might attempt to 
correct assessments of the target based on their perceptions of the biasing 
effect of the environmental factor. Note that in this case, environmental 
noise is unlikely to be incorporated into a decision rule regarding valid­
ity of the message. That is, there is no decision rule that people should 
believe, or disbelieve, messages accompanied by noise. Rather, the per­
son might generate a hypothesis (or theory) at the moment to address 
the effects of the noise. In one study, Wegener, Edwards, Petty, and 
Weary (1996, raw data) played an audiotape of a persuasive message on 
which static made reception of the message difficult. After the message, 
all recipients received a correction instruction and were asked to provide 
their perceptions of the speaker and of how persuasive and convincing 
the message had been. The primary finding was that theories of bias 
associated with how white noise would affect perceptions of speakers 
and messages (which had been assessed during a "separate study" 
earlier in the session) predicted respondents' ratings of the speaker and 
message. To the extent that people believed that white noise would make 
people react negatively to a message or a speaker, ratings of the message 
and of the speaker were more favorable.
Thus, although biases based on characteristics of the message source 
most likely serve as the most salient origin of bias in many settings, many 
other features of the persuasion context can also provoke correction for 
bias. For this to occur, people generally need to become aware of the
7. Although the ELM accommodates reversed effects of variables serving as peripheral 
cues (e.g., if people scrutinize them and determine that they should compensate for their 
effect), the ELM does not specify the mechanism by which this adjustment would take 
place (such as the correction based on a naive theory postulated by the FCM). The ELM 
could also accommodate reversed effects of cues if, in another circumstance, the same 
variable were to increase the amount of scrutiny given to message arguments (e.g., if an 
expert source were to increase the processing of weak arguments, this would decrease 
persuasion). However, this mechanism also does not account for the correction effects 
hypothesized by the FCM.
potential bias and be motivated and able to correct for it (although as 
noted previously, repetition of the same type of theory-based correction 
might make the correction process more automatic over time, cf. Smith, 
1989). Given that such corrections can produce opposite biases in judg­
ment, the conditions under which people attempt to correct their judg­
ments, and the determinants of the theories they hold about the direction 
and magnitude of persuasion biases, warrant additional investigation
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